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 Abstract 
 
The often observed empirical divergence between WTA and WTP measures of welfare change 
continues to be a topic of interest to both theoretical and applied economists. The divergence has 
particularly important implications for environmental policy. In this paper, we review behavioral and 
other explanations of the disparity with a focus on their connections to neoclassical welfare theory, 
and evaluate the empirical evidence of these explanations through the same lens. Some explanations 
of the disparity are consistent with neoclassical models and some are not. Likewise, some imply that 
the divergences are attributed to underlying preferences (neoclassical or not) while others suggest the 
divergences are due to elicitation methods, cognitive limitations, or other non-preference related 
reasons. We argue that the source of the divergence can inform the choice of which measure, WTP or 
WTA, to use in a given empirical application.  
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1. Introduction 
The empirically observed disparity between estimates of willingness to accept (WTA) and 
willingness to pay (WTP) has become an iconic puzzle in microeconomic theory and empirical 
findings. A voluminous literature has studied the magnitude of these disparities, offered explanations 
for the differences, and discussed implications of the findings for neo-classical economics (Brown and 
Gregory 1999; Horowitz et al 2013; Ericson and Fuster 2014).  That some of the earliest work 
exposing this disparity occurred in environmental economics is unsurprising: implementing policy 
recommendations in the sphere of environmental economics requires empirical estimates of the WTP 
and/or WTA for changes in environmental goods. Examples of policy actions where empirical 
estimates are needed include the application of benefit-cost analysis, the computation of damages for 
compensation claims (such as in a Natural Resource Damage Assessment), and the computation of 
Pigouvian taxes. The consequences of the disparity also have important ramifications for 
environmental policy. If there are large differences, the choice of a WTP over WTA (or vice versa) 
could significantly affect that magnitude of a compensatory claim or level of Pigouvian tax and 
therefore resulting pollution levels.  
In this paper, we revisit behavioral and other explanations of the empirical divergence between 
WTA and WTP with a focus on their connections to neoclassical welfare theory. We describe and 
evaluate the empirical evidence on these explanations through the same lens. To foreshadow our 
findings, our interpretation of the literature is that there are a number of plausible theoretical 
explanations for the divergence that are supported by at least some empirical evidence. Some of these 
explanations are consistent with neoclassical theory and some are not. Given the multitude of 
explanations proposed and for which evidence is available, it appears likely that there are multiple 
factors at play in any given empirical finding of a divergence. This, in turn, raises a separate question 
for applied welfare analysts --- what measure of value should be elicited and used in a specific 
application such as a cost-benefit analysis of a proposed wildlife refuge, a damage assessment for lost 
passive use values from an oil spill or an ex post evaluation of national air quality regulations? Should 
the choice be based solely on property rights as much of the traditional literature argued, or does the 
source of the disparity itself inform the choice? 
In this paper, we suggest an approach for choosing amongst the alternatives based directly on the 
analyst’s belief about the cause(s) of the disparity as well as the property right structure governing the 
environmental good. To set the stage, we begin with a brief review of the theory of welfare 
measurement within the neoclassical framework and the underlying assumptions, and briefly describe 
the historical evolution of thinking concerning the choice of measure.  
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2. Hicksian Theory of CV and EV 
Hicksian welfare theory is built on two central concepts, namely compensating variation (CV) and 
equivalent variation (EV), for price or quantity/environmental changes.1 These measures can also be 
interpreted as willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA), and are often empirically 
measured from stated preference methods based on WTP or WTA questions. Which of CV and EV is 
the appropriate welfare measure and which of WTP and WTA corresponds to CV (or EV) depend on 
whether the good being studied is environmental improvement or degradation and on whether the 
individual’s property rights rest with or without the change, as illustrated in Table 1.2 To understand 
the Table, let the individual’s indirect utility function be ( , , )v p q m  where p is the price vector of a 
bundle of consumption goods, q  is the quality of the environment, and m  is her income. Let 0q be 
the current environmental quality and 1q  be the new quality level, with 1 0q q>  representing an 
environmental improvement and 1 0q q<  representing degradation. Suppose 1 0q q> so that the 
welfare being measured is for environmental improvement.3 If the individual has property rights over 
the improved environment, then she is entitled to utility 1( , , )v p q m  and the welfare measure for the 
improvement is equivalent variation EV, which is implicitly given by  
 0 1( , , ( )) ( , , ).v p q m EV m v p q m+ =  (1) 
Here EV(m) measures how much money is needed to bring her to the utility level that she is entitled to 
(i.e., 1( , , )v p q m ) if she does not obtain the improvement. Thus, EV measures the increase in her 
income that is equivalent in utility to the environmental improvement, and equals her willingness to 
accept for not obtaining the “good.” If, on the other hand, the individual has property rights to only 
the degraded level of environmental quality, then she is entitled to utility 0( , , )v p q m , and the welfare 
measure is compensating variation CV, which is given by 
 0 1( , , ) ( , , ( ))v p q m v p q m CV m= − . (2) 
In this equation, CV measures the reduction in income that “compensates” the individual for the 
environmental change, i.e, how much money she is willing to pay to obtain the improved environment 
1 For quantity/quality changes, CV is often called compensating surplus and EV called equivalent surplus 
(Freeman et. al, 2014). To reduce clutter, we use CV and EV to represent welfare changes associated with both 
price and quantity changes.  
2 Table 1 is similar to the first table in Knetsch (2005). 
3 The case of environmental degradation can be similarly analyzed.  
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that she is not initially entitled to.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
Although which welfare measure to use depends on the property rights, Hicksian theory argues 
that CV and EV should be close to each other for moderate environmental changes under rather 
general conditions. To see this, we can rewrite (2) at a different income level, ( )m EV m+ : 
 0 1( , , ( )) ( , , ( ) ( ( ))v p q m EV m v p q m EV m CV m EV m+ = + − +    
This equation, together with (1) and the monotonicity of ( , , )v p q  , implies that  
 ( ) ( ( ))EV m CV m EV m= +   (3) 
Equation (3) underlies the argument that CV and EV are approximately equal when the income 
effects are small, which can be shown by a Taylor expansion of ( )CV ⋅  around m (Horowitz and 
McConnell 2003), by the bounds developed in Randall and Stoll (1980), or by an exact relationship 
shown in Weber (2003). For instance, if the environmental improvement is moderate (so that 
( )EV m  is small), if ( )CV ⋅  is differentiable, and if '( ) 0CV m ≠ , a Taylor expansion of the right 
hand side of (3) around m  implies that 
 ( ) ( ) '( ) ( )EV m CV m CV m EV m≈ + . (4) 
Thus for moderate improvements, and when the income effect is nonzero but small (i.e., when 
( )CV m′  does not equal zero4 but is small in absolute value), ( )EV m  and ( )CV m  should not 
significantly differ from each other. 
These results can be extended to welfare measurement under uncertainty. Let θ  be a random 
parameter that affects the value of the environment, then (1) and (2) can be rewritten as  
0 1 0 1( , , ; ) ( , , ; );   ( , , ; ) ( , , ; ).EV CVE v p q m OP E v p q m E v p q m E v p q m OPθ θ θ θθ θ θ θ+ = = −  (5) 
When CVOP  and EVOP  are independent of θ , they are called option prices and correspond to the 
ex ante WTP and WTA (Graham 1981; Bishop 1982).5 From (5) and following a procedure similar 
4 Note that ( ) 0CV m′ ≠  is required in order for higher order terms to be safely ignored in the Taylor 
expansion. 
5 If CVOP and EVOP are contingent on the realized value ofθ , they are state-contingent welfare measures and 
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to the case of certainty, we get  
 1 1( , , ; ) ( , , ( ) ( ( ); )E v p q m E v p q m EV m CV m EV mθ θθ θ= + − +  
Again, given that ( )v ⋅  is monotone increasing in m , this equation leads to the same condition (3) 
obtained under certainty.  
3. Reasons for the WTP-WTA Divergence 
Equation (4) implies that, under rather general conditions, CV and EV should be of similar 
magnitude for moderate environmental improvements. Since, in the absence of measurement error, 
CV and EV should uniquely correspond to WTP and WTA (or WTA and WTP respectively), the 
significant divergence observed between WTP and WTA values calls into question the validity of the 
Hicksian theory as either a reasonable representation of consumer behavior or as a foundation for 
welfare measurement.  
The importance of this issue has lead a number of economists to propose and empirically test 
explanations for this divergence. We turn to those explanations in this section and to aid in 
understanding, we categorize the proposed explanations for the divergence in Table 2 in the context of 
Hicksian welfare theory. The first column of Table 2 lists categories of implicit and explicit 
assumptions needed in order for WTP WTA≈ , and the second column summarizes deviations from 
these assumptions that have been discussed in the literature. As summarized in the third column, some 
deviations are well within the Hicksian framework, calling for enrichment of the basic Hicksian 
theory to capture the specific contexts of valuation. Others build upon alternative theories, challenging 
fundamental neoclassical economics. Some explanations are theoretical conjectures only, while others 
have been tested in lab, field, or valuation surveys.  
TABLE 2 HERE 
3.1. Explanations that are consistent with the Hicksian framework 
We first discuss several categories of explanations of the WTP/WTA divergence that operate 
within the Hicksian framework. They are fundamentally based on neoclassical preferences but enrich 
the basic model by exploring the unique features of environmental changes, by paying attention to the 
details of decision processes involved in forming WTP/WTA values, and/or by recognizing that 
individuals have limited capacities in optimizing when forming these values.  
the corresponding WTP and WTA values are given by Graham’s locus (Graham 1981; Zhao and Kling 2009). 
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3.1.1. Discrete quantity changes and substitution effects 
Two implicit assumptions are made when applying a Taylor expansion to the right hand side of 
(3) to obtain (4): ( )EV m  is small in absolute value, and ( ) 0CV m′ ≠ . Randall and Stoll (1980) 
show that the first condition is satisfied for infinitesimal environmental improvements. However, 
environmental improvements are mostly discrete, and discrete improvements, when coupled with 
other conditions, can cause (4) not to hold. An obvious condition is when the improvements are 
large, in which case the associated EV is not small relative to income. An alternative condition is low 
substitutability between the environmental good and each of the private goods in the individual’s 
utility function (Hanemann, 1991). When it is difficult to substitute for the environmental good, a 
much larger amount of private goods are needed in lieu of the environmental improvement for the 
individual to be indifferent. That is, even for moderate environmental improvements, the associated 
EV can be quite large, causing (4) to fail. In the extreme case of Leontief utility functions with no 
substitutes for the environmental good, not only can EV be large, but a first order Taylor expansion 
cannot be applied at all since CV is a constant, implying ( ) 0CV m′ = .  
There are a number of papers devoted to examining the empirical relevance of this substitution 
effect. For example, Adamowicz et al. (1993) find that the WTP-WTA disparity for hockey tickets 
increases when the hockey game is not broadcasted on TV or radio compared to when it is 
broadcasted, which suggests that the lack of substitutes increases the WTP-WTA disparity. Shogren et 
al. (1994) show that the WTP-WTA disparity for avoiding a food-born pathogen is larger than the 
disparity for ordinary goods such as candy bars. They attribute this finding to the fact that health does 
not have close substitutes while candy bars do.6 Further, they find that the WTP-WTA disparity for 
avoiding food-born pathogens remains even after repeated auctions while the disparity for candy bars 
disappears. The imperfect substitutability explanation is further supported in three meta-analyses by 
Horowitz and McConnell (2002), Sayman and Onculer (2005) and Tuncel and Hammitt (2014). Table 
3 reports signs of estimated coefficients for variables influencing the WTP-WTA disparity in these 
three meta analyses. In each case, the dependent variable is the (log) ratio of mean WTA to mean 
WTP. The signs reported are significant at least at a 10% significance level, otherwise they are marked 
as not significant. In the first row of the table, the estimated coefficient for ordinary private goods are 
negative, which suggests that larger substitutability of goods decreases the WTP-WTA disparity as the 
theory predicts. 
6 There are other studies reporting WTP-WTA disparity in the context of health and value of life. Examples 
include hearing aid provision (Grutters et al 2008), new medicine (O’Brien et al 1998), health risk from drinking 
water (Viscusi and Huber, 2012) and transport safety (Guria et al 2005). 
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TABLE 3 HERE 
3.1.2. CV/EV do not equal the elicited WTP/WTA 
Compensating and equivalent variations are theoretical concepts and are often measured 
indirectly through observing WTP and WTA choices under specific trading institutions, e.g., whether 
an individual reports that she would vote in favor of paying a certain amount of money to obtain an 
environmental improvement in a referendum. In order for WTP/WTA to be equivalent to CV/EV as 
indicated in Table 1, the trading institutions need to perfectly replicate all the elements that influence 
her CV/EV formation. The literature has identified a number of reasons why elicitation mechanisms 
in WTP-WTA studies can fail to replicate these elements and thus lead WTP/WTA to differ from 
CV/EV. In this case, a divergence between WTP and WTA does not imply a divergence between CV 
and EV nor does it suggest a contradiction to the Hicksian theory. 
Perhaps the most obvious theoretical reason for WTP/WTA to differ from CV/EV is in a case 
where the elicitation mechanism is not incentive compatible so that an individual has incentive to 
misreport her true valuation of the environmental good. Since the reported values (WTP/WTA) differ 
from the true values (CV/EV), WTP can differ from WTA even when CV and EV are equal. Kolstad 
and Guzman (1999) provide an example where strategic behavior akin to those arising from private 
value first price auctions can lead to WTP-WTA divergence. They argue that in many experimental 
settings, eliciting WTP values is similar to bidding for a single object in first price auctions, and value 
shading implies that the reported WTP values are less than the true values. The difference increases as 
the individual becomes more uncertain about the true value of the good. Similarly observed WTA 
values are higher than the true value, resulting in a WTP-WTA divergence that increases in 
uncertainties about the true value of the good being traded. Although this theoretical conjecture has 
never been empirically tested, incentive compatibility is increasingly being studied as an essential 
condition in stated preference surveys (Carson and Groves, 2007; Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao, 2012), 
and it has been observed that not all designs satisfy this condition (Harrison, 2007). The meta-analysis 
reported in Table 3 also provides evidence that incentive compatible mechanisms tend to reduce (but 
not eliminate) the WTP-WTA disparity.  
Even when individuals are not strategic, their WTP/WTA values can differ from CV/EV since the 
former can be formed dynamically while the latter are inherently static concepts. In a series of papers, 
Zhao and Kling (2001, 2004, 2009) show that if an individual is uncertain about the good’s value, has 
opportunities in the future to obtain more information about the value, and is forced to make a costly-
to-reverse purchase/sell decision within an experiment or survey’s time frame, then her optimal WTP 
(WTA) is lower (higher) than her CV (EV). The difference is captured by a commitment cost that 
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compensates for the lost opportunity of learning and making a more informed decision. The 
commitment cost and thus the wedge between WTP and WTA increase as the level of uncertainty 
rises, as reversing one’s decision becomes more costly, and as future learning opportunities expand. 
Zhao and Kling (2001) discuss a series of experimental settings in the literature for which 
commitment costs might arise.  
The commitment cost theory has been tested, directly and indirectly, in a range of lab and survey 
settings. Corrigan et al (2008) undertake a contingent valuation survey to value water quality 
improvements and adopt two treatments, with and without a delay option that offers the respondents 
another chance to vote on the referendum a year later if it fails this time. They find that the average 
WTP with the delay option equals only about 25% of that without the delay option, with the 
remaining 75% being accounted for by the commitment cost. Lusk (2003) conducts a lab experiment 
where subjects bid for coffee mugs and monetary lotteries, with treatments offering combined delay 
and learning opportunities, and/or costly return options. He finds support for the prediction that WTP 
decreases when subjects are given delay and learning opportunities, but finds that the effect of the 
return option on WTP is not statistically significant, possibly due to the cost of incurring the option. 
Kling et al. (2013) test the theory in a field experiment, where they measure the level of subjects’ 
perceived difficulties to reverse their purchase or sell decisions. Consistent with the commitment cost 
theory, they find that lower perceived difficulties to reverse a decision raises WTP and reduces WTA, 
thereby decreasing the WTP-WTA disparity. Ratan (2013) finds similar results, showing that 
providing subjects with opportunities to reverse their decision removes the exchange asymmetry 
typically observed in exchange experiments between two goods (i.e. Knetsch, 1989). Neilson et al. 
(2013) find that opportunities to reverse purchase or selling decisions for lotteries remove the WTP-
WTA disparity.  
Elicitation mechanisms can inadvertently introduce other factors that might distort WTP/WTA 
away from CV/EV. For instance, Franciosi et al. (1996) find that using the terms “buying” or “selling” 
increases the WTP-WTA disparity because those terms could induce subjects to behave more 
strategically (i.e., buying low and selling high). Plott and Zeiler (2007) find a number of effects of 
experimental procedures on exchange asymmetry such as emphasizing ownership, physical proximity, 
and when choices are made by a public show of hands. Each of these increases exchange asymmetry.  
3.1.3. Bounded rationality 
Equations (1) and (2) rely on indirect utility functions, which are derived from the individual’s 
constrained utility maximization. An implicit assumption of the Hicksian theory is that in forming her 
CV/EV, the individual is able to formulate and solve the utility maximization problem subject to her 
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overall income constraint. But in reality she might have limited capacity in understanding the trading 
institution, in formulating her optimization problem, and in finding her optimal decision. The 
literature on bounded rationality argues that, even if individuals have neoclassical preferences, they 
may not optimize when making their decisions, including WTP/WTA decisions, and many 
contradictions to neoclassical theory found in lab and field studies can be attributed to this failure of 
optimizing (Harstad and Selten, 2013). Smith and Moore (2010) go a step further and argue that 
introducing additional “cascading constraints” of cognitive capacity, energy and physical dexterity to 
an individual’s optimization problem can explain many of the behavioral anomalies and should be 
adopted in benefit cost analysis.  
Hoehn and Randall (1987) provide an explicit example of how bounded rationality can lead to the 
WTP-WTA divergence. They first invert (1) and (2) to obtain 1 0( , , )CV m e p q u= −  and 
0 1( , , )EV e p q u m= − , where ( )e ⋅ , the inverse of ( )v ⋅ , is the expenditure function. They then argue 
that it takes time for an individual to search for the minimum expenditure. When time is constrained, 
such as in stated preference surveys (and similarly in experiments), the individual might be forced to 
stop before finding the minimum expenditure, resulting in a higher ( )e ⋅ , thereby reducing CV but 
raising EV.  
The individual’s search for her optimal WTP/WTA can be further impeded by additional (and 
often non-monetary) constraints. The literature on mental accounting argues that individuals might 
treat money differently by putting them in different mental accounts depending on their uses (Thaler 
1985). In other words, money may not be fungible. For example, when deciding her WTP for the 
environmental good, an individual might mentally put the payment in one account that is tailored for 
environmental goods where the marginal value of the budget constraint is higher. In contrast, when 
deciding her WTA, the money flowing in is put in a general account where the marginal value of 
money is lower. The higher shadow value of money when paying for the environment and the lower 
marginal value of money associated with WTA can lead to the WTP/WTA divergence.7 This 
observation is supported by the meta-analyses of Sayman and Onculer (2005) and Tuncel and 
Hammitt (2014). Table 3 shows that out-of-pocket payments have a positive effect on the divergence, 
suggesting that these payments are treated differently from indirect payments such as tax and utility 
bills. 
7 Mishan and Quah (2007) argue that the WTP-WTA disparity can arise when the WTP decision is constrained 
by the budget, noting that the WTA decision never faces a budget constraint. While the payments for 
environmental improvements in most applications are modest, the budget constraint for WTP might be binding 
when mental accounting imposes a tight budget for the account tailored for environmental goods.  
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Another form of bounded rationality arises when the individual is not familiar with the trading 
institution or mechanism and, instead of optimally forming their WTP/WTA values, resorts to her 
basic instinct of “buy low and sell high.” We discuss this literature together with the preference 
discovery literature in Section 3.2.1. 
3.2. Explanations that challenge the Hicksian framework 
In reaching (1) - (5), Hicksian theory makes a number of implicit assumptions about an 
individual’s preference: she knows her preference structure, her preference is defined over her own 
final consumption bundle, and her preference is stable, unaffected by exogenous shocks such as policy 
changes. Several strands of literature on the WTP/WTA disparity deviate from these implicit 
assumptions and introduce the possibilities that individuals do not know their preferences and might 
have to discover them, that their preferences are not stable and might be context dependent, and that 
their preferences are affected by a set of elements richer than final consumption bundles. Each of 
these departures is capable of generating the WTP/WTA divergence.  
3.2.1. Preference discovery 
Individuals may not know their complete preferences or the full effects of their decisions when 
making WTP and WTA choices. Instead, they gradually “discover” their preferences and learn about 
the trading institution. The discovered preference hypothesis (DPH) of Plott (1996) proposes three 
stages of choices with rational choices being formed gradually as individuals gain experience and 
learn about their true preferences and the outcomes of their decisions. Following Braga and Starmer 
(2005), we distinguish value learning, which describes learning about one’s preferences, from 
institutional learning, which represents learning about the outcomes of one’s decisions.8 Unlike 
commitment cost theory in which individuals anticipate and respond to future learning opportunities, 
individuals passively learn and respond to new information under the discovered preference 
hypothesis.  
DPH does not provide a complete theoretical foundation on its own to explain the consistent 
direction of the WTP-WTA disparity. When one is not sure about her own preference or the trading 
institution, she operates beyond the Hicksian framework and thus her WTP and WTA might differ. But 
by no means does WTP have to be far lower than WTA. However, under uncertainty about one’s 
preferences or the trading institutions, an individual might adopt the basic market instinct of “buy low 
8 Value learning focuses on underlying preferences such as risk and time preferences and tradeoffs between 
consumption goods and money while institutional learning focuses on auction rules and bidding behaviors of 
other participants in an auction.  
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and sell high,” which would indeed lead to the observed WTP/WTA disparity. For instance, List and 
Shogren (1999) find that in repeated auctions, buyers typically start their bids low and sellers start 
their offers high. This is similar to the argument that individuals draw from the lower end of the value 
distributions when buying but draw from the upper end when selling. Dubourg et al. (1994) show 
experimentally that when people are uncertain about their valuations of a good, and if the supports of 
their WTP and WTA distributions overlap, they tend to draw values from the lower end of the WTP 
distribution and from the upper end of the WTA distribution. Note that for this line of argument to 
work, one has to make the additional assumption that individuals are more likely to rely on basic 
market instincts instead of optimization under preference or institutional uncertainties. To our 
knowledge, this assumption has not been empirically tested in the literature.  
The experimental literature has offered additional empirical support for DPH’s predictions. One 
strand of the literature suggests that as initial uncertainty about the value of a good increases, the 
WTP-WTA disparity rises. For instance, Okada (2010) and Neilson et al. (2013) use mean-preserving 
lotteries and find that subjects have larger WTP-WTA disparities for lotteries with larger outcome 
variances. Georgantzis and Navarro-Martinez (2010) find that a higher familiarity for a good 
decreases the WTP-WTA disparity. As we discuss below, other studies show that the disparity 
decreases as individuals learn about the values and/or the institutions.  
There are a few studies related to value learning. Kingsley and Brown (2013) find that a choice 
exercise where subjects answer pairwise choice questions between goods removes the WTP-WTA 
disparity. The goods they use include consumption goods such as a mug and a shirt, as well as public 
goods such as parking lots and open space. They find that the choice exercise eliminates the WTP-
WTA disparity for a mug, and argue that this shows value learning helps subjects discover their 
underlying preferences. Bateman et al. (2009) show that providing more information on 
environmental goods through virtual reality visualization reduces the WTP-WTA disparity. In their 
experiment, subjects are asked to value land use change in coastal areas. They find that the WTP-
WTA disparity decreases when relevant information is provided in virtual reality visualization rather 
than in a numeric format, which suggests that more salient information on goods improves 
respondents’ value learning.  
In the case of institutional learning, several empirical studies find that repeated participation in an 
auction dissipates the WTP-WTA disparity (Coursey et al. 1987; Shogren et al. 1994, 2001; Loomes et 
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al. 2003, 2010).9,10 In those studies, subjects learn auction rules and others’ bidding behavior by 
observing auction results through repeated trials and feedback on their decisions. In a similar vein, 
Plott and Zeiler (2005) provide subjects extensive training to reduce their misconception on how an 
auction mechanism works. In their study, subjects learn about the auction mechanism through detailed 
instructions and paid practice rounds. They find that their training removes subjects’ WTP-WTA 
disparity. Engelmann and Hollard (2010) find that exchange asymmetry is removed by a simple but 
novel trading exercise in which subjects are forced to trade their goods with other participants. 
Institutional learning has also been found in the field. List (2004) compares valuations for sports cards 
between experienced traders and inexperienced trades and finds that more market experience reduces 
the WTP-WTA disparity. These results are also confirmed in List (2006). In the meta-analyses of 
Table 3, the estimated coefficients for repeated trials within the same elicitation method and market 
experience are negative, suggesting that institutional learning decreases the WTP-WTA disparity. 
3.2.2. Context-dependent and endogenous preferences 
Hicksian theory assumes stable preferences that are independent of the trading institutions, 
experiences or exogenous shocks. However, empirical evidence suggests that in many choice settings, 
individual preferences are subject to influence by a wide variety of psychological factors, such as an 
individual’s attachment to different choice options arising from the trading institution (Carmon et al. 
2003), induced negative emotion (Lerner et al. 2004), salience of certain decision factors such as costs 
or benefits (Bordalo et al. 2012), and other framing effects. These factors are typically not modeled in 
deriving the indirect utility functions in (1) and (2), but including them can potentially lead to 
divergence between CV and EV. In a broader sense, the endogenous preference literature (e.g., 
Bowles, 1998; Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003), by arguing that preferences are affected 
by such institutions as markets and government policies, has led to the debate on government 
paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). It also poses another challenge to welfare theory: if a policy 
that improves the environment helps lead consumers value the environment more, should ex ante or 
ex post preferences be used to measure the policy’s welfare impacts (Tan and Zhao, 2015)?  
9 There is a potential concern that subjects follow market price feedback (“shaping effect”) rather than learning 
their preferences (“learning effect”) in repeated auction participation. Empirical evidence is mixed. Shogren and 
List (1999) and Loomes et al. (2010) find support for the learning effect while Knetsch et al. (2001) support the 
sharping effect. Loomes et al. (2003) find evidence consistent with both effects. 
10 The WTP-WTA disparity disappears with the repetition of Vickrey auctions, median price auctions and 
random kth-price auctions. On the contrary, the disparity remains with the repetition of a Becker, DeGroot and 
Marschak’s (1964; BDM) mechanism with a multiple-price-list format (Kahneman et al. 1990; Shogren et al. 
2001), probably because the BDM mechanism has a weak penalty for deviation from optimal bids compared to 
other auctions. (Noussair et al. (2004) show than the BDM mechanism has a lower penalty than a Vickery 
auction.) Note that market price is random and exogenous in the BDM mechanism whereas the market price is 
endogenous and reflects other participants’ decisions in a Vickery auction. 
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Positive and negative emotion has been shown to be related to the WTP-WTA disparity. 
Georgantzis and Navarro-Martinez (2010) find that positive feelings from owning a good leads to the 
WTP-WTA disparity because owners want to maintain positive feelings from owning a good. They 
find that owning a good increases positive feelings of subjects, and that the positive feelings raise 
WTA. On the other hand, Lerner et al. (2004) find that induced negative feelings such as sadness and 
disgust reduce the WTP-WTA disparity because subjects want to escape from their negative emotion 
by changing their current environment through selling their endowed goods and buying goods that 
they do not own. Lin et al. (2006) find similar results using induced negative feelings. 
Individuals are also found to treat goods they own as part of themselves, and as a result they rate 
the goods more highly than non-owners. Morewedge et al. (2009) provide evidence supporting this 
motivated taste change. They find that buyers who have already owned a good have a higher WTP for 
the same type of good than other buyers who do not own it. However, attachment from physical 
proximity other than ownership can also increase valuations because proximity gives subjects a sense 
of ownership. Reb and Connolly (2007) test how physical possession affects WTP and WTA and find 
that physical possession has a similar effect as ownership. 
People tend to pay attention to different aspects of an item depending on the nature of their 
decisions, and this different assignment of salience can lead to the WTP-WTA disparity. Bordalo et al. 
(2012) find that sellers tend to pay more attention to the consumption value of the traded good while 
buyers focus more on the related expenditures, resulting in the WTP-WTA disparity. These different 
assessment behaviors between sellers and buyers are also reported in Carmon and Ariely (2000). They 
find that in their experiments using basketball tickets, sellers care more about basketball games 
whereas buyers care more about ticket price and transportation costs.  
Since salience can be altered by framing, certain framing effects can also help remove the WTP-
WTA disparity. If owners can be induced to view the goods as exchange goods rather than 
consumption goods, then benefits of the goods would no longer be salient to owners. Svirsky (2014) 
uses a simple method to induce subjects to perceive chocolate as exchange goods in his experiment, 
by calling chocolate a “chocolate coin.” He finds that this simple name change removes the WTP-
WTA disparity for chocolates, apparently since the chocolate coin framing helps focus subjects’ 
attention away from the consumption benefits of chocolate to its exchange value. Arlen et al. (2002) 
use a different method to induce subjects to perceive mugs as exchange goods rather than 
consumption goods. They frame their valuation experiment using a corporate-agency setting; subjects 
are employees in a firm, and mugs are a production factor. As a result, they find no WTP-WTA 
disparity for mugs. This result is consistent with Kahneman et al.’s (1990) conjecture that the WTP-
WTA disparity would not happen when subjects purchase goods for resale.  
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3.2.3. Expanded domain of preferences 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to Hicksian theory is about its implicit assumption that an 
individual’s utility depends only on her own bundle of final consumption goods. Two central tenants 
of prospect theory are that preference might depend on a certain reference point with higher marginal 
utility for losses than for gains relative to the reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).11 
Reference dependence and loss aversion are considered by many as offering the most compelling 
explanation for the WTP-WTA disparity. In addition, individuals might derive pleasure from moral 
values and warm glow (Boyce et al. 1992; Biel 2011), and this type of other-regarding preferences can 
also lead to the disparity.  
Reference points in three different dimensions are hypothesized to cause the WTP-WTA disparity: 
reference consumption, reference price and reference risk. Losses in consumption (increases in price 
and risk) relative to the relevant reference point is hypothesized to generate a larger loss of utility 
relative to an equal size gain,12 leading to WTP-WTA disparity because when deciding WTA, the 
individual suffers loss of the good. The reference consumption can be defined in dimensions of goods 
and money. In the case of reference consumption, Bateman et al. (1997) find that subjects’ valuations 
are not independent of endowment states and conclude that subjects’ preferences follow reference-
dependent preferences rather than Hicksian preferences. Gachter et al. (2010) find that individual loss 
aversion is positively associated with the WTP-WTA disparity. Knetsch and Wong (2009) find that the 
manipulation of reference states influences subjects’ exchange behaviors in their exchange 
experiments. They also find that emphasizing reference states leads to the exchange asymmetry 
although subjects do not own the good.  
Reference points do not have to be consumption levels. Prices can be reference points and 
individuals can demonstrate aversion to bad deals (Isoni, 2011). Weaver and Frederick (2012) find 
that price information on an outside option influences the WTP-WTA disparity. In their experiment, 
they provide different price information between groups to induce subjects to form different reference 
prices. They find that a higher price of an outside option increases the WTP-WTA disparity.13  
Effects of reference prices are also found in the purchase of eggs. Putler (1992) finds that consumers 
are more sensitive to a price increase for eggs than to a price decrease because they experience losses 
11 See Barberis (2013) for an extensive review on applications of prospect theory. 
12 Reference points are affected by ownership, expectations (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006), history of past 
ownership (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein, 1998) and proximity (Reb and Connolly, 2007).  
13 Results in Weaver and Frederick’s WTP experiment are similar to those in Cherry et al. (2004), but the two 
studies offer different explanations for the results. Cherry et al.’s explanation is based on strategic behaviors of 
bid shaving where subjects do not bid beyond the price of an outside option whereas Weaver and Frederick 
explain the results using reference prices.  
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when the market price is higher than their reference price. Brown (2005) conducts an ex post survey 
after valuation experiments to find out how subjects have decided on their valuations. Around one-
fifth of the subjects indicate “seeking a good deal”—i.e. selling high, buying low—as a reason for the 
WTP-WTA disparity, which is consistent with the reference price explanation.   
Risk can also be reference points. Viscusi and Huber (2012) find that reference risk and loss 
aversion for additional risk lead to the WTP-WTA disparity in evaluating health risk from drinking 
water. In their study, tradeoffs between health risk and the cost to reduce the risk are examined to 
calculate the value of statistical life. They find that subjects are more sensitive to increases in their 
health risk than decreases.  
The WTP-WTA disparity can also occur when choices involve moral values and ethical 
responsibility. The effects of moral values may be larger for WTA than for WTP because owners have 
stronger guilty feelings when they give up an item involving moral values than buyers who have no 
such guilt. Higher WTA is therefore required to offset the negative feelings from giving up the item 
(Biel et al. 2011). There are a few studies that provide support for moral values and ethical 
responsibility as the explanations for the WTP-WTA disparity. Anderson et al. (2000) find that 
subjects demonstrate a larger WTP-WTA disparity for ecologically-produced eggs than for 
conventional eggs. Boyce et al. (1992) find that killing trees left with an experimenter increases the 
WTP-WTA disparity more than if the trees were not to be killed.  
4. Which welfare measure to use ---WTA or WTP?  
Now that we have described alternative theoretical explanations for the WTP -WTA disparity, we 
turn to the question of which measure (WTA or WTP) an applied researcher should use, say in 
performing a benefit cost analysis, and how the choice of welfare measures can be informed by 
understanding the likely source(s) of the disparity.  
As noted earlier, in principle, property rights determine whether CV or EV is appropriate to use in 
valuing environmental changes because property rights determine the appropriate reference welfare 
level for evaluating the environmental change (Carson et al. 2001; Freeman et al. 2014).14 If CV and 
14 Knetsch (1990, 2005, 2010) has argued that reference environmental levels that people actually use to evaluate 
changes would be more appropriate than ones determined by property rights. In other words, “what changes people 
regard as being in the domain of losses and those they feel to be in the domain of gains” (2010, p.186) should be 
considered in deciding welfare measures. However, this poses practical problems as an agreement on reference 
environmental levels may be hard to be reached, especially when people know that their choice of reference points 
can influence policy decisions (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1993). Knetsch suggests that “most people’s intuitions seem 
likely to allow for wide agreement” (2010, p.186) on reference environmental levels, but this is an empirical 
question. There may be cases where property rights may not be clearly specified (Brown and Gregory, 1999). In 
those cases, Knetsch’s approach may be useful. 
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EV are close to each other and can be measured accurately by WTP or WTA, then the choice of 
measure is largely a theoretical nicety. However, if there is a large divergence between WTP and 
WTA, the implications can be substantial. In the case of a significant divergence, how does the source 
of the disparity inform the empirical choice? One answer to this question that has become embedded 
in official guidance is that WTP is to be preferred and used, even in cases where the property rights 
would suggest a WTA value. This recommendation (Arrow et al. 1993; OMB, 2003) is logically 
consistent with the view that the divergence arises due to a problem in the elicitation method and 
implies that elicited WTP is a better proxy even for EV than is elicited WTA. However, as discussed 
earlier, the disparity between WTP and WTA might be driven by a divergence between CV and EV 
(e.g., due to substitution effects or reference dependent preferences), and WTP might be significantly 
different from CV (e.g., due to commitment costs). In both cases, using WTP instead of the 
theoretically correct measure could lead to erroneous conclusions (Knetsch, 2010).  
To simplify our discussion, we consider an environmental improvement where property rights are 
to the improved level, so that EV is the relevant welfare measure and its observational equivalent is 
WTA. Whether elicited WTA values or some other values should be used to measure the welfare 
depends on the underlying reasons for the WTP-WTA disparity, specifically on answers to the 
following three questions:  
1) Is CV approximately equal to EV? 
2) Does the elicited value of WTA equal EV? 
3) Does the elicited value of WTP equal CV? 
Table 4 lists the appropriate welfare measures for the variety of reasons discussed in Section 3 and 
Table 2. These cases can be divided into two broad categories: those with a “No” answer to Question 
1) and “Yes” answers to Questions 2) and 3), and those with opposite answers (“Yes” to 1) but “No” 
to 2) and 3)). In the first category, true CV/EV values can be elicited by WTP/WTA, but CV and EV 
are different for a variety of reasons, e.g., due to lack of substitutes, bounded rationality, reference and 
context dependence, value learning and moral values. Fundamentally what drives the WTP-WTA 
divergence is the individual’s own preference structure, and the divergence reflects results of her 
optimization rather than failure of the value elicitation procedure. Thus, the correct welfare measure is 
EV and thus WTA, so that elicited WTA values should be used for welfare analysis. The logic here is 
similar to that of Knetsch (2010), but the key distinction is that one does not have to give up on 
Hicksian theory to make the case for the use of WTA. Note that even in these cases, there might be 
delicate issues to consider. If an individual’s preference is endogenous and affected by the 
environmental policy, one needs to be careful in choosing whether ex ante or ex post WTA values 
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should be used. For instance, Tan and Zhao (2015) find that experiencing improved air quality during 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics Games increased Beijing residents’ perceived value of air quality 
improvement. This result suggests that policies that improve the environment can change preferences 
for environmental goods and calls into question whether ex ante or ex post perceived value should be 
used for welfare measurement.  
TABLE 4 HERE 
In the second category where the answer to Question 1) is “Yes,” but answers to Questions 2) an 
3) are “No,” CV is equal to EV, but the correct welfare values of CV/EV might not be elicited by 
WTP/WTA. Table 4 shows that there are several situations corresponding to this category: 
commitment costs, lack of incentive compatibility, institutional learning and bad deal aversion. For 
instance, in the case of commitment costs, if the lack of decision delay and learning opportunities in a 
survey reflects real world contexts, as would be the case if the government is making the environment 
decision within the survey’s time frame, then the associated commitment cost should be part of the 
welfare measure and WTA should be used. But if the delay and learning opportunities are precluded 
by the fact that an individual has to answer a survey within a fixed time frame while such 
opportunities do exist in the real world, WTA is biased upward and commitment cost should be 
removed in order to obtain the true welfare measure.15 In this case WTP may be a better 
approximation of EV if its associated commitment cost is lower. Similarly, in the case of bad deal 
aversion, if price reference points are introduced by the elicitation mechanism and affect the elicited 
WTA values, WTA will be biased and need to be adjusted for the bias.  
When EV is equal to CV, if WTP and WTA differ from them, it is possible that one is “more 
biased” than the other. For example, individuals might be more familiar with making purchase 
decisions than with making selling decisions. If their being unfamiliar with the trading institutions 
drives the WTP/WTA disparity, it is conceivable that WTP is closer to EV than is WTA. In this case, 
WTP might offer a closer approximation to EV than WTA.  
In all likelihood, many real world welfare elicitation might involve multiple reasons underlying 
the WTP/WTA disparity so that answers to Questions 1) – 3) are all negative. The key message of 
Table 4 is that careful examination of the underlying preference structure and the elicitation 
mechanism is needed to determine the correct welfare concept of CV or EV, the direction of the biases 
of WTP and WTA, and which measure offers a better approximation for the correct welfare measure.  
15 See Zhao and Kling (2009) for detailed discussion of the two situations.  
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5. Final Remarks 
In this paper, we have reviewed the explanations provided in the literature for the often observed 
divergence between WTA and WTP in laboratory and field experiments.  A range of empirical 
evidence provides support to a number of alternative explanations, neither uniquely confirming, nor 
repudiating all others. Some of these explanations with supported evidence are consistent with 
neoclassical preferences, but some require adoption of an alternative paradigm.  Given the 
prevalence of the divergence and its large empirical magnitude, the choice of using a WTP when the 
WTA measure is appropriate (or vice versa) can have important policy implications and potentially 
lead to inefficient public policy decisions.  
To aid applied researchers facing this conundrum, we have argued that the appropriate measure 
will depend on the explanation for the cause of the disparity. If a researcher can identify the likely 
sources of the disparity arising in a given situation, she can make an informed decision about the 
appropriate measure to use. In this sense, the choice of which welfare measure to use is somewhat 
analogous to the choice of a good instrument in an econometric study or the most appropriate 
distributional assumption to represent uncertainty in a theoretical model: theory and evidence can 
provide input but the final decision will require judgment and careful thought on the part of the 
analyst.  
As more evidence becomes available and/or additional explanations for the divergence are 
provided, it will be important to revisit the logic of choosing amongst the potential welfare measures 
presented here. Indeed, we view our efforts to categorize the appropriate welfare measure as shown in 
Table 4 as more of a road map for thinking about the issue than providing a definitive answer for any 
and all particular applications. Researchers need to carefully consider the elicitation procedure they 
are using and the context of the policy analysis before determining which of WTA and WTP (or 
neither) is the most appropriate measure to use.  
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 Table 1. Correct welfare measures depending on property rights and the good to be valued 
 Property rights lie with improved 
environment 
Property rights lie with degraded 
environment 
Environmental 
Improvement 
EV / WTA 
(for not obtaining the improvement)  
CV / WTP 
(for obtaining the improvement) 
Environmental 
Degradation 
CV / WTA 
(for obtaining the degradation) 
EV / WTP 
(for avoiding / not obtaining the 
degradation) 
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Table 2. Causes of WTP-WTA Divergence 
Implicit assumptions of Hicksian 
theory 
Deviation and enrichment categories Implications for welfare theory 
Local price or quantity changes Discrete quantity change and substitution effects Enrich Hicksian theory with adequate modeling of 
substitution opportunities 
CV/EV = WTP/WTA (i) Elicitation mechanism not incentive compatible  
(ii) Commitment cost theory  
(i) Not a challenge to Hicksian theory 
(ii) Enrich Hicksian with dynamics & information 
Agents can fully optimize Bounded rationality such as limited cognitive 
capacity and mental accounting  
Enrich Hicksian to include constraints of cognitive 
capacity  
Agents know their own preferences (i) Value learning  
(ii) Institutional learning 
(i) Modify Hicksian theory to allow for preference 
discovery  
(ii) Not a challenge to Hicksian theory 
Preference is stable and context 
independent 
(i) Attachment and motivated taste change  
(ii) Salience  
Modify Hicksian preferences to allow for effects of 
contexts 
Preference is defined on own 
consumption bundle 
(i) Reference dependence and loss aversion 
(ii) Moral values  
Modify Hicksian to allow for reference dependence and 
moral values. 
 
  
20 
 
Table 3. Comparison of three meta-analyses on the WTP/WTA disparity 
 Horowitz and McConnell 
(2002): WTA / WTP 
Sayman and Onculer (2005): 
ln (WTA/WTP) 
Tuncel and Hammitt (2014): 
ln (WTA/WTP) 
Ordinary private goods ─ ─ ─ 
Real transaction 
─ (Not significant) 
─ 
─ (Not significant) 
Incentive-compatible elicitation* + ─ 
Out-of-pocket payment n.a. + + 
Sayman and Onculer: 4+ trials for a same good in a same 
elicitation method 
Tuncel and Hammitt: the last of repeated trials 
n.a. ─ ─ 
Market experience both buying or selling the good n.a. n.a. ─ 
WTP framed as gain n.a. + n.a. 
WTA framed as gain n.a. ─ n.a. 
Note that signs for estimated coefficients significant at least at 10% significance level are reported unless specified otherwise. Sayman and Onculer do not 
distinguish real transaction with incentive-compatible elicitation. *: Incentive-compatible question formats such as open-end questions with Vickrey 
auction, random nth-price auction and BDM mechanism, and single closed-end question, which is not specified in Sayman and Onculer. 
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Table 4. Appropriate welfare measure to use for policy analysis 
Deviation and 
enrichment categories 
Explanation for the 
WTP-WTA disparity 
Value relationship questions Welfare measure to use for policy 
analysis CV=EV? WTA=EV? WTP=CV? 
Welfare measure for 
quantity changes 
• Lack of substitutes No Yes Yes Use WTA. 
 
CV/EV different from 
WTP/WTA 
• Commitment cost Yes No No Use WTA if the commitment cost occurs 
due to real world constraints. Otherwise 
WTA is biased upwards.  
• Lack of incentive 
compatibility 
Yes No No WTA is biased. Incentive compatible 
elicitation mechanism is needed. 
Bounded rationality • Mental accounting 
 
No Yes Yes Use WTA. 
 
• Limited cognitive 
capacity 
 
No Yes Yes Use WTA.. 
Preference discovery • Value learning No Yes Yes Use WTA. 
 
• Institutional learning Yes No No WTA is biased. May need to allow for 
institutional learning. 
Context dependent 
preferences 
• Attachment 
• Motivated taste change 
• Salience 
No Yes Yes Use WTA. Should be cognizant of 
government paternalism.  
Reference dependent 
preferences and moral 
values 
• Reference dependence 
and loss aversion 
No Yes Yes Use WTA. 
• Moral values No Yes Yes Use WTA. 
• Bad-deal aversion 
 
Yes No No Use WTA if elicitation mechanism 
reflects real world constraints. If not, 
WTA is biased. 
Note: The Table presents appropriate welfare measures for an environmental improvement when the property rights lie with the improved environment, so 
that the property right based welfare measure is EV.  
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